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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Finlde'
(decided June 18, 1999)
Following a bench trial, defendant Brian Finde was "convicted
of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, three counts of
assault in the third degree and various Vehicle and Traffic Law
offenses." 2 The Appellate Division reversed Finkle's conviction
after finding his "waiver of a jury trial" to be ineffective.3 The
appellate court contends defendant's waiver was invalid under
New York Criminal Procedure Law, Section 320.10(l)' because it
was executed one week after the close of trial and not before trial
as the statute requires.5 In addition, the Appellate Division found
the waiver ineffective under both Article I § 2 of the New York
State Constitution6  and Criminal Procedure Law, Section
320.10(2)' because it was unclear whether Finkle signed the
written waiver in "open court."8  Consequently, the Appellate
1 692 N.Y.S.2d 265 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 692 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1999).
2 Id at 266.
3id.
4 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10(1) (VcKinney 1995). This statute
provides in pertinent part: "Except where the indictment charges the crime of
murder in the first degree, the defendant, . . . may at any time before trial waive
ajury trial .... " Id
' People v. Finkle, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. This section provides in pertinent part:
A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal
cases, except those in which the crime charged may be
punishable by death, by written instrument signed by
defendant in person in open court before and with the approval
of the judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to try the
offense.
Id
7 N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAW § 320.10(2) (McKinney 1995). This statute
provides in pertinent part: "Such waiver must be in writing and must be signed
by the defendant in person in open court in the presence of the court, and with
the approval of the court." Id
I Finlde, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
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Division held that a waiver analysis is not suitable based on the
facts at issue and concluded instead that the entire bench trial
violated both the New York Constitution and the Criminal
Procedure Law, as it took place without a "valid and effective
written waiver" executed by the defendant.9
During jury selection, the defendant, his attorney, and the
Prosecution met with the trial judge in his chambers.'0 At that
time, defense counsel indicated to the judge that he discussed both
the right to a trial by jury and the option to proceed with trial on a
non-jury basis with his client." As a result, counsel indicated the
defendant agreed with his recommendation to waive a jury trial
under the circumstances of the case.'2 The trial court then advised
defendant of his right to have his case tried by "twelve citizens of
the County.' 3 Defendant in turn indicated he was aware of this
right but was prepared to give it up. 4 Finde assured the trial court
that was in fact his request, the court than accepted his oral waiver,
and the trial proceeded.15 At the conclusion of proof, the case "was
adjourned for one week" pending the court's verdict 6 When the
parties returned to hear the verdict, the court indicated it had
neglected to obtain defendant's written waiver of jury trial and
asked defendant and counsel if they were executing a nunc pro
tunO' at that time."8 Defense counsel answered in the affirmative
9 Id
10 Id. at 267 (Pigott, Jr., J., dissenting).
11 Id
12 Finkle, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 266. Defendant, whose blood alcohol content was
0.15, was involved in an automobile accident after attempting to pass the vehicle
traveling in front of him. As a result of the accident, one person was killed and
three others were injured. Id at 266.
13 Id. at 267 (Pigott, Jr., ., dissenting).
"I Id The judge asked the defendant whether he was requesting that the judge
"sit as the ultimate determiner of guilt or innocence" in the matter. The
defendant responded, "Yes, Your Honor." Id
15 Id
16 Id
17 Id at 268. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY defines nunc pro tunc as, "now for
then, or in other words, a thing is done now, which shall have same legal force
and effect as if done at a time when it ought to have been done." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 737 (6th ed. 1991).
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and handed a written jury waiver up to the court. 9 The trial court
then executed the waiver, accepted it, and rendered its final
verdict.20
The Appellate Division, in following People v. Page,2'
concluded that waiver lof-a juy trial-must be-accompanied by "a
written instrument signed by defendant in open court before the
trial judge," because that is what the New York Constitution
expressly demands.' In reliance on this statement,.the Appellate
Division argued the same must be said regarding the New York
State Constitution's implication, and the Criminal Procedure Law's
clear requirement, that defendant's "written waiver must be
executed 'before trial."'"
However, the dissenting justice took a different approach to the
circumstances. Although the dissent agreed in part with the
majority opinion, J. Pigott, Jr. disagreed that the posttrial waiver
was invalid.24 In the dissent's view, after consulting his attorney
the defendant clearly indicated his desire to waive a jury trial and
have the court sit as the ultimate determiner of fact and arbiter of
guilt or innocence.' Consequently, in the dissent's view, the
record clearly supported the conclusion that Finde knowingly,
18 Finkle at 268 (Pigott, Jr., J., dissenting).
19 Id.
20 Id.
2! 88 N.Y.2d 1, 665 N.E.2d 1041, 643 N.Y.S.2d I (Ct. App. 1996). The court
held the "unambiguous language and history of the constitutional waiver
provision lead inescapably to the conclusion the waiver of the right to jury trial
procured other than 'by the defendant in person in open court' is invalid." Id. at
10.
22 Finkle, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (relying on People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 665
N.E.2d 1041,1045-46,643 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5-6 (Ct. App. 1996)).
23 Id. at 267.
2 Id at 268. The dissenting judge, J. Pigott, Jr., agreed that the defendant's
oral waiver of a jury trial in chambers was not effective. However, in Judge
Pigott's view, since the defendant voluntarily signed the written waiver and did
not move for a mistrial or object to the procedure in which it was obtained, the
defendant effectively "waived any objection that the procedure failed to conform
to statutory requirements." Id
Id. at 267 (4th Dep't 1999) (Pigott, Jr., J., dissenting).
[Vol 16
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voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.' At
the end of proof defendant was informed his original oral waiver
was ineffective and chose at that time to execute a written waiver z
By this action, the dissent argues, the defendant "ratified the
procedure utilized by the court and waived any claim that the
procedure was defective." The dissent also noted that although
the majority found it was unclear whether the waiver was signed in
open court, defendant failed to pursue this argument in his brief
and therefore, the argument was deemed abandoned.'
The framers of the State Constitution specifically required a
written, signed instrument in Article I, § 2, in order to ensure that
a criminal defendant fully understands the implications and
significance of giving up the fundamental right to a trial by jury."
According to the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Page,3'
the members of the 1938 Constitutional Convention?2 proposed the
current requirement that a waiver must be in writing in the
presence of the court as a protection of the rights of defendants.'
Highlighting the importance of such requirements, the Convention
members pointed out that a defendant, out of human habit, will
think twice before putting his name to a piece of paper
documenting he has waived one of his greatest rights?4 Thus, the
2 Id. at 268. The dissenting judge points out that defendant was represented
by counsel throughout the proceedings, that defendant indicated his desire to
waive a jury trial, and finally that defendant executed the waiver after being
informed that his original waiver was ineffective. Id
27 id
28 Id
2' Id (relying on Ciesinski v. Town of Aurora, 202 A.D.2d 984, 609 N.Y.S.
745 (4th Dep't 1994) for the proposition that appellate courts will not consider
new theories or issues on appeal, if proof might have been offered to refute or
overcome those theories had they been presented in the first instance at trial).
10 People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 6, 10, 665 N.E.2d 1041, 1046,643 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6
(Ct. App. 1996).
31 Id
I See id at 6. It was at the 1938 convention that the State Constitution was
amended to adopt the current requirement that waiver of jury trial be a written
instrument signed by defendant in open court before and with the approval of
the court. Id.
33 Id
I See 2 Revised Record of 1938 NY State Constitutional Convention.
2000 743
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history of the written waiver provision establishes that the
requirement of a signed, written waiver is critical to ensuring the
defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived one
of the greatest rights a citizen has, the right to a trial by jury.35
Both the Page and Finkle courts express the importance of
vigilaritly enforcing the rights that are guarded and protected by the
express provisions of the State Constitution, impressing that such
provisions should not be disregarded lightly. 6 In accordance with
this belief, the Finkle -court stated -that defendant's written waiver
received by the trial court "one week after trial" did not constitute
a waiver executed in "open court., 37 In addition, the trial court had
not warned the defendant of the consequences of such waiver, nor
had it informed defendant of his "absolute right to a mistrial and a
retrial" by jury.38 Therefore, the Appellate Division in Finkle
reasoned that to uphold a waiver made without warning or inquiry
by the court one week after the close of trial, just before rendering
of the verdict, would result in an "intolerable relaxation" of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements.3 9
In contrast, the Federal Constitution does not recognize the right
of criminal defendants to have their case tried before a judge
alone.' The framers of the Federal Constitution gave little
indication of their intention behind Article III, § 2, which states
that the "Trial of all Crimes shall... be by jury."'" In addition,
permitting defendants to choose their mode of trial was not
widespread at the time the Federal Constitution was written, nor
did any defendant claim to have such a right in any known case
immediately following its adoption.42 Certainly, if the framers of
35 See id
36 See Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 9, 665 N.E.2d at 1046, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 6; Finkle,
692 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
37 id.
38 Id.
31 Id at 267.
o See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
41 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. This section provides in pertinent part: "The
Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be byjury." Id.
42 Singer, 380 U.S. at 31. The Singer court traces the history of the right to a
jury trial from English common law, to the U.S. colonies, where waiver existed
in isolation, through the Constitutional Convention, adoption of the Constitution,
744 [Vol 16
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the Constitution intended to give the accused the option to waive a
jury trial, it is difficult to understand why they did not draft the text
to provide such an option43
However, in the 1930 case Patton v. United States,' the U.S.
Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether a federal
criminal defendant has the right to waive a trial by jury.'
Choosing its language carefully, the U.S. Supreme Court in Patton
dispelled any notion that a defendant had an absolute right to
demand a trial before a judge alone.' Nevertheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court took the position that a defendant charged with a
federal crime may forego the Constitutional right to a trial by jury,
as long as it is done with the defendant's express and intelligent
consent, the consent of government counsel, and the approval of
the court under responsible judgment 7
Returning to Singer v. United States," the Supreme Court noted
its awareness that the states have adopted several procedures to
waive a jury trial in state criminal cases.49 Furthermore, the framers
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (F. R. Crim.P.) were
also aware of these alternatives when they presented F. R. Crim.P
Rule 23(a) to the court.50 The Court has promulgated the nile and
Congress has adopted it.
51
and finally the first U.S. Supreme Court case to decide the right to trial by jury
was a right the accused could choose to waive. Id at 27-34.
43 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 2, cl. 3, supra at note 41 and accompanying text;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Singer court stated: "Indeed, if there had
been recognition of such a right, it would be difficult to understand why Article
HI and the Sixth Amendment were not drafted in terms which recognized [such]
an option." Singer, 380 U.S. at 31.
" 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
45 ld. at 268S.
ISee Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 (1930).
47 Id
48 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
1 Id at 36-7. The Court points out that some states have made waiver
contingent on approval by the prosecutor, others, while not giving the
prosecutors a voice, have made court approval a prerequisite and still others
have made the question of waiver one solely for the defendants informed
decision. Id
50 Singer, 380 U.S. at 37. See FED. P, CRIM. P. 23(a). The rule states in
pertinent part: "Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the
2000 745
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In upholding the validity of F. R. Crim.P Rule 23(a), the U.S.
Supreme Court stressed the importance of the Government's role,
in cases where it feels a conviction is warranted, to assure the
accused is tried in the forum the framers of the Constitution
believed would produce. the fairest result, trial by jury. 2
Therefore, the Court has come to recognize the right of an accused
to waive a trial by jury as long as the government's attorney
consents and the court approves.
The Federal Constitution does not expressly provide citizens
with the option to waive the right to trial by jury. In contrast, the
New York State Constitution clearly provides a defendant with that
option. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
Federal Constitution to provide a defendant, charged with a federal
crime, the opportunity to waive the right to trial by jury. As noted,
both the State and Federal Governments passed legislation
intended to safeguard a defendant who chooses to waive such a
fundamental right. In addition, both Federal and State law require
such waiver to be in writing and approved by the court. However,
federal law requires that a court's approval of a waiver must be
accompanied by the consent of the government attorney, but the
New York Constitution does not. Finally, although New York law
clearly requires that the defendant sign such waiver in open court,
it appears a federal defendant does not have to do so for the waiver
to be accepted. In sum, although both federal and state laws allow
defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and
consent of the government." Id
51 See Singer, 380 U.S. at 37.
52 Id. at 37. The Court expressed that:
[t]he government attorney in a criminal prosecution is not an
ordinary party to a controversy, but a 'servant of the law' with
a 'twofold aim ... that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer.' It was in light of this concept of the role of the
prosecutor that rule 23(a) was framed, and we are confident
that it is in this light that it will continue to be invoked by
government attorneys. Because of this confidence in the
integrity of the federal prosecutor, Rule 23(a) does not require
that the Government articulate its reasons for demanding a
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a defendant to waive the right to trial by jury, the requirements to
do so are quite different.
Diana Coen
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